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INTRODUCTION 
 
tructural changes over the last thirty years in industrialized societies 
have challenged the institutions that regulated the economy and the 
labour market during the so-called golden age of capitalism.  Global 
competition, technological and organizational innovations, financialization of the 
economy, and service sector expansion are some examples of the complex social 
transformations that are creating new forms of economic and labour regulation.  
S
In an environment marked by instability and uncertainty, state 
governments and corporations have focused their strategies of competitive 
adjustment on labour flexibility and deregulation and reductions in social 
expenditures.  Although these meanings are diverse and the concepts are used to 
characterize specific situations, the idea of flexibility finds its most controversial 
dimension in the field of labour market regulation.  Labour institutions and 
social security have come under attack by neoliberalism and its attempt to design 
self-regulated markets.  The result of these changes is that both unemployment 
and precarious employment came back to threaten economic and social stability 
all over the world.  This article analyzes, in a comparative way, labour 
relationships in both Canada and Brazil and the recent institutional changes in 
their employment regimes. 
 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN CANADA AFTER WORLD WAR II 
 
The system of collective bargaining in Canada has central importance in 
managing conflicts between employees and employers.  From the post-war 
period to the middle of the 1970s, collective agreements carried out between 
unions and large employers, such as those within the automotive sector, were 
capable of influencing and spreading collective bargaining gains to workers from 
non-organized sectors.  During the 1950s, for example, the labour movement had 
the power to obtain union representation rights and significant wage increases.  
During the 1960s, especially because of the activism and militancy of public 
sector workers, unions became even stronger.  They succeeded in 
institutionalizing rights in the broader political arena by establishing anti-
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discrimination and human rights laws (to protect people from discrimination 
based on ethnicity, race and gender, etc.) and extended minimum employment 
and social insurance rights through several Canadian provinces.  The large 
private-sector unions - such as those in steel, transportation, communication and 
mining - homogenized gains in wages, benefits, and carrier plans, and 
consolidated combined strategies of action. 
The democratic achievements of so-called industrial pluralism (Fudje and 
Tucker, 2000), however, affected Canadian workers differently.  Unionization 
increases and collective bargaining benefits were centered in core industries, but 
only stronger unions were able to regiment their conquests nationally.  As stated by 
Fudje and Tucker (idem: 277), union demands could not depart too far from market 
norms, while anti-discrimination law did not prevent employers from engaging in 
practices that negatively affected protected groups.  This selective incorporation 
reinforced labour market segmentation in a way that, even during a golden period 
of economic growth and union strength, a majority of Canadian workers still 
depended on individual contracts and a minimum enforcement of employment law 
to determine their wages and labour conditions.   
Canadian labour market segmentation had specific divisions.  The 
composition of the secondary market, typically represented by low-wage skilled 
sectors and occupations, was marked by a disproportional participation of women 
and other marginalized groups, especially immigrant workers.  This means that 
the primary labour market has been traditionally represented by male, white, 
bread-winning workers.1  Although the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a significant 
growth of women’s participation in unions and the labour market - particularly 
because of public employment and with it, the expansion of gender entitlements 
- they continued occupying positions in low-wage activities and sectors (Fudge 
and Vosko, 2001).  
Immigrants represented the other large contingent of workers occupying 
“less noble” employment positions within the Canadian economy.  During the 
1990s, immigration was responsible for about 70% of the increase in the 
workforce, with the majority of immigrant workers being in unstable and low 
paying jobs.  A social consequence of this segmentation was that it brought them 
different and unequal life opportunities with regards to living areas, access to 
justice, political participation, health, education and social security (Galabuzi 
2004).    
It was essentially these groups, along with young workers, that formed 
atypical employment regimes and accounted for a large bulk of the non-standard 
employment growth during the 1990s.  Because collective bargaining is so strongly 
decentralized in Canada, different employees working for the same employer 
belong to different unions or bargaining units.  This fragmentation, reinforced by 
different provincial legislation, makes very difficult the unification of collective 
bargaining once negotiations occur at the workplace level.  As workers have the 
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liberty to decide whether or not they want union representation, union pluralism 
strengthens the complexity of the representative structure, but weakens the potential 
for union harmony and expansion (Chaykowski, 2005; Jackson R. 2005; Jackson A. 
2005).2
Although fragmented, the Canadian labour movement has a political 
importance beyond the world of workplace disputes.  It is a key part of the 
broader social democratic movement and, despite some decline in the 
unionization rate, is still an important power in the fight for equity and social 
justice.  Taras et al (2005) estimate that about 48% of Canadian workers enjoy some 
access to formal collective representation.  Unionized workers have better wages 
and benefits and are more protected against discrimination than non-unionized 
workers.  The median union wage premium (the difference between union and 
non-union wage) was 14.3% in 1999, this differential being even larger between 
low skill occupations (Frost and Taras, 2005; Jackson A, 2005). 
The painful economic recession from the early 1990s, which increased the 
unemployment rate to almost 12%, and the expansion of the service sector, where 
unionization is traditionally low, had a significant impact on union density and 
bargaining power.  The rate of unionization dropped from 33.2% in 1992 to 31.7% in 
1997.  This compares to a rate of 43% in manufacturing industries in 1976 (Fudje and 
Vosko, 2001).  A vital portion of this union density is represented by public 
employees, since the majority of workers from small companies, especially in 
service activities, are non-unionized in the private sector.     
During the 1990s, changes in business strategies and the economy as a 
whole furthered the downward trend in union strength.  Corporate restructuring 
focused on dismantling vertical structures and subcontracting, which had a 
decisive impact on labour market segmentation.  This also occurred in small 
companies, where it is already more difficult to organize workers.  Still, 
according to Fudge and Vosco (idem: 290), between 1979 and 1989, almost 90% of 
all employment growth in Canada was generated by businesses with less than 100 
employees.  In 1991, a little more than half of all Canadian workers were self-
employed or worked in firms with less than 100 employees.  This leads us to 
conclude that the weaknesses of unions are related to their inability to expand to 
workers from these small firms and to those within the traditional service sectors 
(finance, retail, hotels, restaurants, personal services, etc.), which is fertile terrain for 
the proliferation of precarious and insecure employment. 
 
CASUAL, CONTINGENT, PRECARIOUS: THE KIND OF JOBS THAT 
INCREASED IN CANADA DURING THE 1990s  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, employers’ search for more flexibility and 
market competition encouraged the proliferation of atypical employment 
regimes challenging the standard employment patterns established in the post-
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war era.  Firms preferred to contract casual, temporary, part-time, and/or self-
employed workers.  Employers not only demanded more flexibility in 
employment terms and conditions, but also - and more predominantly – lower 
labour costs.  According to Taras et al (2005), only 54% of Canadian workers belong 
to the standard employment category, the other 46% are self-employed or in a situation 
of part-time or temporary employment.  Although the wages and conditions of these 
employment regimes are quite heterogeneous, they are also less stable and durable.  
This insecurity is illustrated by the provision of lower wages and weaker fringe 
benefits, a marked shift from the pay and benefits assured by standard employment. 
Part-time employment is associated to a work time of less than thirty 
hours a week.  The proportion of workers in these jobs rose from 11% in 1976 to 
17% in 1994 (Fudge e Vosko, 2001).  The advantage to employers is that they pay 
only part of the compulsory social contributions.  Women’s participation in the 
labour market had significant influence in part-time employment growth.  It is 
women who, along with young workers, dominate this kind of employment, not 
necessarily by choice, but for the lack of full-time offers (Jackson A, 2005). 
Temporary employment is another key business strategy to make contracts 
more flexible.  Hiring temporary workers means that employers (both public and 
private) exempt themselves from the responsibility of paying higher wages and 
greater benefits, workers’ compensation premiums, as well as from procedures 
related to hiring, firing and training.  The proportion of the workforce employed 
in temporary jobs increased from 7% in 1989 to 11% in 2003.  Most prevalent in 
this category were younger workers, who in 1995 represented 32% of all 
temporary workers in Canada (Fudge and Vosko, 2001; Jackson A, 2005).  With this 
comes the increase in the number of private “temp” agencies responsible for 
intermediating workers.    
Mainly because of low wages and benefits, the proliferation of these 
forms of precarious employment is increasing the number of multiple job 
holdings per person, another sign that many Canadians have to work longer just 
to maintain their standard of living.  The combination of temporary work (which 
among the self-employed represents almost 15% of the workforce) and part-time 
employment by multiple job holders marks a deep labour market polarization in 
Canada.  In addition to this, the working day is becoming longer.  According to a 
federal government report (see Taras et al, 2005:19), only about 33% of the 
workforce keeps standard business hours (Monday to Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5 p.m., in 
a full time job at the employer’s workplace); and almost 25% of all workers put in 
fifty hours per week or more (counting overtime, travel and office work brought 
home). 
At the same time, there was no average real wage gain for workers in recent 
years, despite low inflation, low unemployment and significant GDP growth.  The 
average hourly wage was $17.48 in 1993, adjusted for inflation of the period, but was 
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$17.70 a decade later (Jackson A, 2005).  The wage proportion of total GDP has been 
falling in the last few years.3
Inequality in income growth can be better understood by looking at the 
percentage of workers living in poverty.  In 2003, about one in four Canadian 
workers received low wages (which is defined as lower than 66% of the national 
median hourly wage, or less than $11 per hour).  More specifically, about one in five 
men and one in three women are low paid (Jackson A, 2005).  This, along with 
reductions in government transfers, especially in Employment Insurance and social 
assistance benefits, creates for many Canadians a life of poverty.   
This income polarization embraces not only wage inequality and 
employment instability, but social insurance policies formulated by the state.  The 
deterioration of even minimum employment standards, as well as the difficulties of 
organizing sectors where there is increasing precarious employment (mainly 
because of legal restrictions), illustrate a trend towards the re-commoditization of 
labour relations in Canada.  During the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal policies, 
corporate restructuring, weak enforcement of labour laws and limited state policies 
created a downward harmonization which has contributed to regulate precariousness 
(Fudge and Vosko, 2001, 2001a), increasing labour market polarization and 
inequality. 
 
LABOUR RELATIONS IN BRAZIL4
 
 Although Brazil was becoming re-democratized by the late 1980s, collective 
bargaining rights were far behind those which had been achieved throughout the 
developed world.  The state assumed a key role in mediating and regulating the 
interests of employers and employees.  At the beginning of the 1940s, the 
Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho – CLT (Brazil’s Labour Law), defined the basic 
labour rights that are still in force today.  The CLT responded to early industrial 
workers’ demands for political incorporation.  This happened in a limited way in 
two forms.   
First, even minimum labour rights and union legislation ignored the 
plight of rural workers - at that time a large majority of the workforce - and 
public servants.5  Second, a large number of urban workers did not enjoy regular 
employment in the formal economy and therefore were excluded from state-
defined social insurance policies and programs.  In Brazil, as in Canada, the 
limited incorporation of workers to capitalist expansion was responsible for the 
formation of a segmented labour market.  The difference was that workers in 
Brazil faced far greater social injustice.  The segmentation generated an informal 
labour market and constituted an employment regime completely lacking in 
rights.    
With controlled unions and the majority of workers without entitlements, 
economic growth took place without across-the-board increases in workers’ 
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income, let alone any commitment by the state to a policy of full employment.  
Some structural unemployment was beneficial to business interests and 
functioned to expand the labour market of very low wage and precarious jobs. 
 The lack of any notion of citizenship rights for the poor and the working 
class contributed to the structural heterogeneity of workers employment 
conditions.  This restricted the range of social and labour statutes, creating a 
model of formal employment rights for some alongside a marginalized and 
informal labour market for others.  This reality was deeply aggravated during 
the 1990s, with the number of informal jobs surpassing those of the regulated 
employment sector, as we will see later.  
 
CONTROLLED UNIONS AND AUTHORITARIAN MANAGEMENT 
 
 State control over wages and strike limitation and/or prohibition, 
especially under authoritarian governments, withdrew any real collective 
bargaining power from unions.  Conflicts between labour and business usually 
resulted in breaking the law and were normally solved through labour court 
mediation.  This prevented unions the space to confront managers’ despotic 
practices, so that any resistance or challenges by workers in the workplace 
remained latent or repressed, with no legal possibility of becoming recognized 
collective claims.  
At the same time, union legislation created a structure that made it 
difficult or even prevented unions from cooperating through a more centralized 
bargaining unit.  Forming trade unions was forbidden until the establishment of 
the 1988 Constitution.  But even today, while trade unions have a considerable 
political role, they do not have legal bargaining power.  This vertical and 
decentralized structure has been responsible for the union movement’s extreme 
fragmentation (sometimes even within the same company), which weakened the 
workers’ bargaining power. 
This weakness, however, needs to be understood in its historical process.  
The exclusion of the majority of workers from the national development project at 
the beginning of the 1960s fostered large waves of protest, many of them based on 
revolutionary ideology, opening the way to a conservative authoritarian backlash by 
the dominant class.  During the post-1964 regime, which established more than 
twenty years of dictatorial government, class struggles by workers were dealt with 
in an extremely repressive way.  The regime removed left-wing political parties, 
intervened directly and extensively in unions, and persecuted, banished, 
tortured or assassinated militant workers and union leaders.  Social movements 
and strikes were crushed violently and state intervention restricted unions to 
bureaucratic and assistencialist activities.  
This meant that as Brazil experienced the so-called “economic miracle,” 
unions could not fight for wage gains tied to productivity.  Within companies, 
52   JUST LABOUR vol. 9 (Autumn 2006)   
predatory, personal and authoritarian forms of labour management 
predominated.  The so called Novo Sindicalismo was an important mark in 
challenging that authoritarian order.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, waves of 
strikes took place throughout the country, supported by large popular 
movements, demanding union autonomy and political rights.  The Novo 
Sindicalismo had arisen from shop floors to struggle against employers and the 
state and to promote collective bargaining, representation in the workplace and 
the right to strike.  At the same time, it led a social movement that fought for 
Brazilian re-democratization.  
The culminating point of these struggles was the Constitutional Reform 
of 1988, in which more democratic principles were established.  These included, 
among others, the right to collective bargaining, the right to strike, and the 
freedom to establish unions apart from state control.  The following years saw an 
increase in the membership of unions as well as a strengthening of collective 
bargaining.  This new labour movement, however, was not able to change 
Brazil’s extremely fragmented approach to union representation, divisions 
within unions, employers’ resistance, governance crises and economic instability.  
It also failed to bargain for broader employment and income improvements. 
During the 1990s, neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, a 
tightening of the money supply, downsizing, out-sourcing and contracting out 
helped create a recession that led to massive layoffs.  In 1997 and 1998, a federal 
act institutionalized the following: temporary interruption of employment, pre-
determined contracts with reduction of compulsory social contributions, wage 
decreases along with working day reductions, and labour cooperatives which 
stimulated self-employment growth, etc.  The structural fragilities of the 
Brazilian labour market (low wages, excessive instability of employment, low 
workers’ skill), along with other measures, led to a deterioration of employment 
conditions (see Krein, 1999).  
 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT REGIMES IN 
BRAZIL DURING THE 1990’S 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the high unemployment and economic uncertainty 
reinforced by a long and painful recession weakened the position of labour in 
disputes with employers.  Government policies were grounded in tight monetary 
strategies and fiscal adjustment, which led to cutbacks to social programs such as 
education and health care.  Although the high inflation rates of the 1980s had 
been reduced to a stable level, there was not enough employment growth.  As a 
result of industrial restructuring and neoliberal state reforms, the 1990s 
experienced the extinction of almost 3.3 million formal jobs (Mattoso, 1999).  
Despite all the rhetoric about labour flexibility being a key to reducing 
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unemployment, by the end of the decade, the unemployment rate had reached a 
level never seen before in Brazil.6  
People predominantly searched for income within the informal market 
where there are several forms of temporary, irregular, precarious and self-
employment.7  It was obvious, during this period, that the numbers of people 
working in the streets of urban areas selling all kinds of goods (clothes, food, 
imported products) had increased.  This activity was related to a clandestine 
economy formed by small businesses.  Also remarkable was the growth in the 
number of workers performing old activities that are not recognized as regular 
jobs: car keepers on the streets, recycled garbage collectors, ambulant workers 
making ads, shopping porters, casual domestic workers, etc.  The percentage of 
the Brazilian workforce employed in the formal economy dropped from 53% in 
1991 to 45% in 2000.  The percentage of the workforce in the informal economy 
grew from 36.6% in 1986 to 50.8% in 2000 (Sabadini & Nakatani, 2002; 
Cacciamali, 2000). 
 Another result of these structural changes in the labour market was an 
increase in what was internationally recognized as one of the most unqual 
concentrations of income in the world.  Recent research carried out by Dedecca 
(2003) shows us that the percentage of the paid workforce within the total 
economically active population dropped from 84% in 1992 to 81% in 1999, while 
wage share as a percentage of Brazilian GDP dropped from 37.5% to 32.8% 
between 1991 and 2000.  In contrast, the corporate gross profit rose from 38.5% to 
41.4% of GDP during the same period. 
 Although market income from informal labour is not represented in these 
statistics, unemployment and precarious employment growth during the 1990s 
was responsible for increasing the number of people living in absolute poverty.  
According to the Fundação de Pesquisa Econômica in São Paulo, the biggest 
Brazilian metropolis, the number of homeless people increased 20% between 
2000 and 2003.  Other research, such as the so-called O Mapa da Fome (the Famine 
Map) from Fundação Getúlio Vargas, illustrates that 29.3% of the Brazilian 
population live under the poverty line, defined as those receiving a median wage 
of $33 (U.S.) a month or less per person.  This number jumps to 50% of the 
population in northern Brazil, giving us an idea of the country’s socio-economic 
regional disparities (Jornal do Brasil, 10/07/2001). 
 This reveals the immense challenges facing Brazilian democracy.  The 
experience has demonstrated that labour flexibility, along with a lack of welfare 
protections, resulted in a reduction of labour rights and an increase in the 
precariousness and flexibility of work.  An opposite trajectory will have to be 
found by regulating the informal labour market to ensure minimum labour and 
social rights to all workers, and by strengthening unions’ ability and power to 
represent workers throughout the economy.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The interventionist logic from the late 1930s to the 1970s was common in 
both Brazil and Canada.  The specificities between the two are revealed in the 
intensity, extension and grade of autonomy with which the state ensured labour 
and social rights - all of which were much stronger in Canada.  Generally, the 
autonomy entitled to Canadian unions, however limited, is one of the key 
elements to historically distinguish the formation of labour relation systems in 
the two countries.  It made possible, by means of collective bargaining and 
broader political institutions, a more equal distribution of wealth in Canada.  
This distribution can be thought of not only in terms of economic achievements, 
but also in terms of the role of the welfare state.  Conversely, in Brazil, during 
significant periods of economic growth, state control over unions, as well as 
social movements, found these groups excluded from any dialogue regarding 
income distribution or collective economic policies.  Collective bargaining, as the 
most democratic mechanism for redistribution of economic growth, has never 
had the political importance in Brazil as it has had in Canada, even as it is 
becoming less prevalent in the latter.  
 The formation of polarized labour markets is common to both Brazil and 
Canada.  Brazil’s extreme economic inequality is partially due to a complete lack 
of regulation, and therefore, a lack of rights for the majority of workers.  
Canadian workers find themselves in a better situation, still protected by 
minimum working standards and a stronger welfare state.  
 In both countries, labour market fragmentation can be explained, in part, 
by a strongly decentralized collective bargaining structure and other union 
arrangements that make cross-industry co-operation difficult.  This tendency has 
been reinforced since the 1980s, when corporate and economic restructuring 
undermined the union movement by creating more flexible and deregulated 
labour markets.   
 It is necessary, however, to remember the specificities of each country.  
The challenge in Canada is to re-regulate labour markets to ensure and expand 
rights, especially by permitting greater union organization.  In Brazil, the 
challenge is more Herculean.  It does not only involve re-regulating the labour 
market to strengthen union representative power, but also consists of regulating 
the informal labour market, which means ensuring universal, minimum labour 
standards and social security rights.  These tasks demand a strong welfare state 
in order to ensure fundamental citizenship and social rights for working people.   
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1  Typically, workers in the primary labour market work for big employers, are more organized, have better 
skill levels and, as a product of collective bargaining, have more employment security and better wages 
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and benefits.  In the secondary labour market, which is strongly competitive and labour intensive, workers 
are less organized, more prone to accept any job, have less employment stability and lower wages.   
2  Campolieti et al (2005) illustrates how employers can delay the certification process and destabilize 
workers’ support or consent for the union.  Explicit anti-union practices by Wal-Mart are an emblematic 
case.      
3  The inflation rate in Canada dropped from 12% at the beginning of the 1980s to around 7% in 2003.  The 
medium unemployment rate reached 12% at the peak of the 1992-1993 recession. Although it was 
stabilized to 7.3% in 2003, it is still far higher in some regions.  The median GDP per person during the 
same period increased 25%, but real personal income increased at only half that rate, which meant an 
increase in corporate profits as a percentage of national income.  This corporate share registered a jump of 
10.6% of GDP in 1988, bottomed out at 4.7% in 1992, then jumped again to 12.6% in 2000, remaining above 
12% in 2003 (Jackson A, 2005).  Still, according to this author, there were significant increases in corporate 
profitability, which have benefited even more from corporate tax cuts.  
4  The complete version of this section can be found in Costa (2005). 
5  Rural workers remained a large portion of the workforce until the end of the 1960s, when countryside 
conflicts were exacerbated.  Public servants remained submitted to the state’s patrimonialist bureaucracy.  
A statute of rights and duties was instituted only at the start of the 1990s. 
6  According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in 1998 there were seven million 
unemployed workers (9.2% of the economically active population ).  In 2000, unemployment reached 11.5 
million, or almost 15%. 
7  Self-employment increased approximately 10% between 1992 and 1999, representing 15.7% of the Brazilian 
work force in 1999. 
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